The report, which is based on the conference titled The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond co-sponsored by AFCC, RSI and Marquette and hosted by Marquette, examines the status of court ADR programs-both in the family context as well as the general, civil, one-and challenges faced by them, the primary challenge being the lack of appropriate institutional support needed to run high-quality court ADR programs. The report attempts to help with cross-fertilization between these at times disconnected groups, emphasizing new ADR options as they relate to the ever-evolving use of the mediation process and other Hybrid ADR processes. The report outlines the conference participants' ideas for the future of court-connected ADR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Court-connected alternative dispute resolution (court ADR)-ADR programs organized, funded, run, or endorsed by the courts-has come a long way since it first emerged in the 1970s. However, court ADR still faces some major challenges; the primary challenge is the lack of institutional support-both financially and policy-wise-needed to run high-quality court ADR programs that, to borrow from Professor Lawrence Susskind, are not just "efficient" but also lead to "wise," "fair," and "stable" results. 1 One of the main reasons for the lack of institutional support stems from the fact that the courts have not fully embraced what ADR was meant to offer: efficient and effective conflict resolution processes that do not compromise, and perhaps even enhance, perceptions and experiences of fairness and justice.
2 Instead, court ADR appears to focus more and more on " 'efficiency for the sake of efficiency.' " 3 Efficiency, however, cannot and should not be the only focus of court ADR programs; because courts fund and authorize ADR programs as well as mandate parties to participate in them, they are also responsible for ensuring the quality of court ADR programs.
Over the past thirty-five to forty years, there have been a number of parallel efforts to establish court ADR programs within various legal contexts-efforts that have produced, and continue to produce, a wide and rich body of knowledge about ADR. Although much progress has been made, these efforts tend to be somewhat fragmented-courts, ADR professionals, and scholars that work in the family context have often followed one trajectory, while those who operate in the broader civil context followed others. Moreover, there is divergence in the types of challenges being faced and innovations put forth even within individual substantive areas of law where ADR is practiced. Along with these differences, there are also multiple areas of overlap and there is potential for court system without compromising the judicial mandate to provide for fairness and justice. 11 In response to the Pound Conference and Professor Sander's call for a "multi-door courthouse," the process of institutionalizing ADR began 12 (although initially in a relatively fragmented manner rather than through a systematic, national rollout of any kind). 13 At the same time, family court service agencies started developing mediation out of existing processes, such as custody evaluation and conciliation counseling. 14 For example, court staff members were trained as mediators beginning with a pilot program in the Los Angeles Conciliation Court in 1973. 15 Similarly, the Family Self-Determination program was started in 1974 in Dane County, Wisconsin. 16 By 1980, California mandated mediation in all child-custody disputes, 17 and within a decade, family mediation had spread to thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C. 18 While court ADR serves a very important function within the overall dispute resolution process and appears to be destined to remain a permanent part of it, court ADR is not fully meeting its aspired to original goals of providing multiple efficient, effective, and fair ADR services. Instead of the hoped-for multi-door courthouse, most jurisdictions 19 offer mediation as the only ADR service. Moreover, the types of mediation services offered do not always provide parties with the opportunity to determine the outcome of their dispute on their own terms in a non-coercive environment. 20 In fact, the manner in which ADR is being practiced-and particularly mediation as the most prominently offered ADR service-tends to be more coercive, with diminished fairness safeguards, 21 and as some commentators argue, with potentially negative impacts particularly on the poor, minorities, and women. 22 Both civil and family ADR programs currently operate within a difficult climate. Courts are dealing with increasing caseloads and decreasing resources. 23 There is a risk that the most recent budget crisis might enhance courts' and court administrators' tendency to perceive ADR as a tool in the narrow service of short-term efficiency. Focusing on short-term efficiency, although an important goal for court ADR programs, often compromises the innovative characteristics of ADR interventions when it is the dominant goal. 24 Indeed, when discussing the landscape of court ADR, multiple conference participants emphasized administrative-cost considerations and the financial crisis as probably the most critical factors to the future of court ADR, and in light of the current trend, some emphasized the need to preserve that which is unique about court ADR. 25 While the resources available to courts (in general) and court ADR programs (in particular) are shrinking, the need to provide high-quality ADR services and better case management to parties is mounting. One reason for this increase in the need for good services is the surge in pro se litigants who do not know how to navigate the court system, ADR included. 26 A related problem is the proliferation of non-native English speakers, which further magnifies the inaccessibility of the court system to many. 27 These challenges are compounded by the rise in high conflict, 28 often resulting in relitigation, 29 as well as by the foreclosure crisis and the severe economic downturn. Courts serving families face additional unique challenges: incidents of reported domestic violence, abuse and neglect, and substance abuse are more widespread, which further complicate the manner in which justice is administered to families. 30 These mounting needs, both in family and general civil disputes, often require a wide range of ADR interventions alongside the traditional, adversarial litigation option.
The pressures that court-ADR programs are facing can trigger a "circling of the wagons" mentality within the ADR community aimed at preserving what is already in place. Or, it can lead to a careful look at the existing ADR programs with an eye toward enhancing them to meet both courts' goals and parties' needs without compromising the unique ADR innovations and the fairness and justice functions ADR must serve. 31 The primary focus of the conference was on the latter approach: to improve and grow ADR based on some of the successful models already in existence, utilizing the knowledge and expertise accumulated since the emergence of ADR due to research and experience. 32 This Report hopes to contribute toward these efforts.
The next four Parts of the Report, Parts III-VI, will initially focus on mediation and the role of the mediator; shift toward the broader role of an ADR intervener, whether as a neutral in the classic mediation sense or otherwise; and finally turn to the importance of clarity in goal-setting, design, and implementation of ADR programs. This progression mirrors and expands upon the conferenceframing plenary session.
III. COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION
Despite Professor Sander's call for a "multi-door courthouse," mediation became the primary ADR process in the family and broader civil arenas. 33 In the family context, California was the first to adopt statewide, mandatory mediation in all custody disputes in 1980, 34 and approximately thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia followed suit. 35 In the civil context, most programs offer "essentially only one process-a malleable, hybrid form of mediation." 36 Since court-connected mediation was the launching point for the discussion of court ADR that exists beyond mediation, this Report will start by briefly discussing court-connected mediation to provide some context for the "beyond."
37 In fact, mediation is not only the central component of any ADR program, both presently and likely in the future, but it also has been one of the most researched and debated court ADR processes. 38 As a result, reviewing the discussion concerning mediation provides the best context for examining some important questions relevant to all other types of ADR systems.
A. THE GOALS OF MEDIATION AND COURT-CONNECTED CHALLENGES
Most proponents of mediation envisioned a process founded on the idea of providing parties with the opportunity to self-determine the outcome of their dispute. 39 Although not in a uniform manner, a broad understanding of self-determination has gradually narrowed, a narrowing that directly impacts the manner in which mediation is practiced. 40 This "thinning" self-determination is in major part a result of the potential, but not necessary, tension between the goal of self-determination and an over focus on narrow administrative efficiency considerations. 41 Mediation was originally intended as a voluntary and informal process designed to empower parties to explore the resolution of their disputes on their own terms rather than within the existing adversarial and legally rigid formal process. 42 These goals are often encapsulated within the concept of self-determination, originally understood as the promise that the parties will have the power to determine the outcome of their dispute in a non-coercive, voluntary environment. 43 The process characteristics incorporated into mediation in support of this understanding of self-determination are the voluntary participation and decision-making by the parties, as well as the neutrality of the third-party mediator. 44 Confidentiality is also a significant characteristic meant to guarantee the open and non-coercive nature of mediation. 45 As reflected in the opening plenary session of the conference, how these characteristics are precisely defined and how they interplay can vary. Some, like Professor Susskind, would argue that while the parties should determine their own outcome, the mediator has a responsibility to ensure that the outcome is of the best quality and as fair as can be, not only as applied to the parties but also to others that may be impacted by the results. 46 Others, like Professor Stulberg, argue that making the mediator responsible for the outcome would inevitably undermine self-determination and, therefore, must be rejected; 47 instead, the focus in mediation should be on allowing the parties themselves to decide what is right for them. 48 While this debate reflects variance, it also shows that these characteristics of mediation have been and still are central to the practice of mediation, even if the precise manner of implementation may vary in practice. 49 Indeed, mediation proponents generally believe that adherence to the core characteristics of mediation in the actual practice of mediation is necessary to ensure that mediation meets the goal of self-determination.
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In the court-connected context, these characteristics of mediation, as a manifestation of selfdetermination, were also relied on in support of the argument that mediation can be fair in a manner that meets the courts' mandate to provide for justice. 51 Indeed, self-determination, defined broadly, was one of the central justifications for diverging from the formal protections and the legal norms that would be applied to the parties had they gone through the traditional process offered by courts. 52 The fact that parties have the ability to voluntarily and meaningfully participate in the process of deciding their outcome, along with having the sufficient knowledge needed to make such a decision, 53 is meant to provide for a fair process, however fairness is defined.
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While self-determination (and its varying definitions) certainly plays a role in shaping courtconnected mediation, 55 perhaps the most significant factor in determining how mediation is actually practiced is administrative efficiency. 56 As noted by a number of those who attended the conference, administrative efficiency can be constructed narrowly to encompass short-term judicial economy considerations: Does the intervention dispose of cases, free the court's dockets, and preserve court resources? Or, more broadly, it can be understood to include effectiveness in meeting the court's role of providing access to justice, administering justice fairly, and providing for long-term sustainable resolution.
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The broad definition does not necessarily preclude the narrow one; however, an exclusively narrow focus can dramatically impact the manner in which mediation (or any other ADR intervention) is implemented at the expense of the intervention's stated goals and innovative value. Indeed, how the mediation process is set up within the court system will likely dictate more about the quality of the intervention than the training and intentions of the mediator. In the words of Dr. Mayer, "I think that's exactly the relevance of how the system tees things up-it determines in many ways whether what we are engaged in is a responsible approach to dealing with cases or not." 58 While a number of court mediation programs are not only carefully and thoughtfully designed and implemented, it appears that a fair number of such programs incorporate mediation based on narrow administrative considerations, due to a focus on case management and due to limited resources. 59 The primary goal for mediation for courts with such a narrow focus has become more and more the efficient-quick and cheap-settlement of cases, which is certainly an important goal for court ADR programs, but one that must not trump other important goals, such as self-determination, fairness, and justice. 60 Mediation driven primarily by narrow administrative efficiency considerations may include the following relatively coercive features found in various jurisdictions: mediation would be settlement focused, 61 mandatory, 62 and relatively short; 63 allow for or require the evaluation of the parties' claims; 64 and allow for or require the mediator to report parties' good faith participation and provide a recommendation to the court based on the content of the mediation. 65 Each one of these features may not on its own compromise the quality of mediation being offered. For example, a more directive form of mediation, such as evaluative mediation, may be appropriate in some cases and, in fact, may be precisely what the parties want. Such features, however, can undermine self-determination to various degrees by undercutting voluntariness, neutrality, and confidentiality, and by taking away the ability of the parties to make their own decisions in a non-coercive environment. 66 This is particularly so where the mediation programs that include such directive and relatively coercive features do not incorporate informed consent by the parties as a component of the process. This reality raises the question whether the benefits of mediation as it seems to be practiced on a fairly wide scale-benefits defined differently based on the perspective of different stakeholders-outweigh, or should outweigh, the potential harm to the parties and even the damage done to how people perceive courts as public institutions.
B. COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION-GOING FORWARD
To justify the practice of mediation as part of the court system, mediation must be practiced in a manner consistent with its stated goal of self-determination and with the intertwined characteristics of neutrality, confidentiality, and voluntariness. 67 As a starting point, this will require a clearer definition of self-determination in relation to these characteristics and the establishment of mechanisms that will relieve the pressure that is put on parties to settle as well as mechanisms that might also encourage mediators to not over-aggressively push for settlement where settlement is either not appropriate or not desired by the parties. 68 What is needed most is the clear articulation of court mediation programs' goals and practices that are consistent with self-determination and the related characteristics of neutrality, confidentiality, and voluntariness not only within the operation of the actual mediation process itself but also within the manner that mediation is set up as part of the larger court process. 69 Courts and mediation programs would have to ensure that mediators adhere to such goals. 70 Conference participants consistently stated that the level and type of institutional support will determine how the mediator will actually behave as much as, if not more than, the actual intentions of the mediator. While there are many others, some of the significant areas to be improved identified in the conference were providing for sufficient time in the mediation, allowing opportunities for additional sessions, and not pressuring the mediators to exclusively focus on achieving settlement at all costs. 71 *** While mediation is one ADR process that needs improvement, mediation, even when practiced appropriately, is not always the right intervention for all disputes, which may involve parties that, to different extents, lack the ability or desire to self-determine. Such limitations, however, do not mean that ADR interveners cannot play a different and significant role within court ADR programs other than as mediators, as long as the role is well-defined and the process itself is well-designed and implemented to benefit the parties and be fair to them.
Indeed, the role of the intervener may vary as long as the process of intervention is fair and transparent. For Professor Susskind, regardless of the role of the intervener, a process has to lead to a fair (as perceived by the parties), efficient, stable, wise, and well-informed resolution. According to him, a well-designed, high-quality process will lead to such outcomes. 72 For Dr. Mayer, the intervener has to be transparent and realistic about his role, which is not to ensure a good outcome, but rather to provide disputants with the opportunity to engage constructively. 73 For Professor Stulberg, being impartial is preferred, but not necessary, as long as the process is fair and viewed as such by the participants. 74 Indeed, as long as the intervener is perceived to be open-minded and even-handed, parties seem to be less concerned about impartiality-in the sense that this term is used in the mediation context-of the third party. 75 All the panelists emphasized that ADR professionals must keep in mind that the role of the intervener is to serve the parties, not the courts, and that any ADR process has to be structured in a manner that will allow the intervener to intervene ethically. 76 The following section of the Report, which is primarily based on discussions and panels that took place at the conference, will explore how courts that wish to support effective ADR programs that include interventions other than mediation may address these similar challenges.
IV. BEYOND MEDIATION
As noted in the second panel of the conference, ADR processes other than mediation that might have mediative components may be more appropriate to some conflicts. 77 Similarly, Dr. Julie Macfarlane encouraged the abandonment of "the one-size fits all fallacy." 78 Indeed, there are situations where there is a risk that one party will use mediation to coerce the other into an agreement or parts of one, such as when particular types of domestic violence are involved or when one party has a significantly higher level of power that is being used in the mediation as leverage. There are other situations where one or both of the parties lack the capacity to meaningfully participate due to mental illness or substance abuse. 79 There are also parties that are incapable of making decisions on their own in mediation due to the level of conflict and dysfunction. 80 While this level of high conflict is not found in the majority of cases, it often requires the bulk of courts and their professionals' attention. 81 Finally, there may be parties that simply want a lesser level of self-determination and instead expect to be directed to a solution, or to be provided with information that will better help them reach one. 82 All of these parties, for different reasons, may need an intervention that includes mediative functions but is nonetheless something other than mediation.
In fact, while mediation is not always the best intervention for everybody, parties in many cases can still benefit from other effective and efficient ADR interventions. 83 Rather than assume a "pure" self-determination versus coercion binary, there is room for ADR processes with varying degrees of "convergence" between self-determination and directiveness. 84 It follows that the role of the ADR intervener will change according to the levels of convergence within a given ADR process. Courts that incorporate ADR should consider providing different types of interventions for different types of conflict and capacity levels. This should be done along a continuum that starts with non-directive mediation and gradually moves toward a blend of mediative and more directive characteristics, matching interventions to needs. 85 Such an approach will not only benefit the parties, but it will also be a more prudent use of courts' scarce resources and likely enhance the manner in which the courts are perceived and experienced by the public it serves. 86 The next Part of the Report will explore the interplay between self-determination and directiveness within two specific ADR interventions that were the subject of presentations at the conference: ENE and PC. It will also highlight some important fairness concerns related to these processes. While at the conference these interventions were discussed in the family context, the discussion below intends to draw out some principles that can be applied to a broader context of ADR.
A. EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION
ENE, one of the topics presented at the conference discussed within the family context, 87 is an example of an ADR process that was developed with a view toward the core characteristics and goals of mediation: confidentiality, impartiality, and certain degrees of self-determination. ENE is transparently more directive than the classic approach to mediation used in the family context, which tends to be (or at least intends to be) on the elicitive and facilitative side. 88 The ENE process, as practiced in Minnesota and presented at the conference, starts with a case management conference subsequent to a custody-related court filing. A team of male and female evaluators-a particular adaptation to the family context-explain the process to the parties and stress the importance of the parents' voice within it. 89 The evaluators then gather what they deem to be sufficient facts from the parties to determine what would be the best outcome for them, with a special consideration of the children's needs. The determination is then conveyed in the form of a recommendation to the parties. 90 Following the recommendation, the ENE team meets with both sides to shape an agreement that can be tailored to meet the needs of the parties and their families. 91 Approximately 70% of cases are reported to settle through the ENE process, as practiced in Minnesota.
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In comparison, under an ENE program established in the civil context in the Northern District of California, parties that are assigned to the process must attend "with the attorney who will be lead counsel should the case go to trial." 93 Prior to the ENE session, each side submits a statement to the neutral that identifies session participants, major disputed issues, and any discovery that would be necessary for meaningful settlement discussions. 94 The protocol of the session itself is very structured: following an explanation of the program and procedures, each side presents an opening statement outlining their arguments. 95 The evaluator may ask questions and probe for strengths and weaknesses. 96 The evaluator then identifies issues in agreement and issues in dispute, and adjourns to a separate room to prepare a written evaluation. 97 Before sharing the evaluation, the parties are encouraged to explore settlement with the help of the evaluator. 98 If either party declines, the evaluator discloses their written assessment and again facilitates discussions. 99 If no settlement is produced, the evaluators may help the parties develop an efficient approach to case management. 100 With the consent of the court, the parties may agree to a follow-up meeting with the evaluators.
101
The goal of ENE, whether in the family context or in a broader civil context, is to educate the parties by providing them with a reality check 102 that may help them recalibrate their expectations and move them away from entrenched, non-compromising positions. With this reality-check in place, the parties, with the help of the evaluators, are in a better position to come up with their own solutions and agreements. Although the recommendation is non-binding and confidential, the evaluators are relying on the informal authority of their position and expertise to encourage and direct the parties toward a solution that fits within the recommendation of the evaluators.
The requirement to "make your case" to the evaluators coupled with the injection of the professional opinion of the evaluators tends to undermine self-determination in the original sense of the term. 103 However, ENE includes characteristics that provide a counter-balance to this somewhat diminished level of self-determination. For one, the process is transparent, satisfying the requirement, as stated by Dr. Mayer, to provide "accurate labels of the neutral intervener's role, labels that do not mislead the parties." 104 Moreover, similar to mandatory mediation in many jurisdictions, although the initial attendance may be mandatory, continued participation in ENE is voluntary, at least in the family context, giving the parties the option to opt out once the process is explained to them and at any later point in time. While attending and participating in the civil ENE program described above appears to be mandatory, the evaluator's assessment is not binding. The civil ENE program seems to assume that the parties will be represented by counsel, further mitigating the threat of coercion. Perhaps most significantly, the assignment to ENE in the Northern District of California involves the participation of the parties and their lawyers. 105 In other words, ENE, especially as practiced in Minnesota but also in the Northern District of California, is designed to ensure a meaningful process of informed consent.
In addition to transparency and choice, the process is confidential, allowing for a frank and open discussion without concerns over how the ENE process, and particularly the recommendation itself, may impact the outcome of the dispute if it ends up being litigated. Finally, the evaluators try to maximize the parties' opportunities to make their own decisions at various stages of the process within the constraints of the recommendation or, as the example from the Northern District of California illustrates, even prior to the recommendation being made. 106 The relatively high level of self-determination and lowered level of coercion, the potential benefits derived by the parties, and the efficient use of court resources all justify the use of ENE within court systems. Some important issues to consider when exploring the inclusion of ENE include whether parties should be mandated to participate in the process; at what point of the process the parties should be allowed to opt out, if at all, after the initial explanation or after a good faith attempt to reach a resolution following the recommendation; and whether the recommendation of the evaluators will remain confidential and not be reported to the presiding judge. Depending on the approach adopted, the levels of directive-ness, intrusion, and potential coercion will shift. Regardless, ENE may be a more appropriate ADR process for parties that cannot reap the benefits of non-coercive mediation as long as it is set up appropriately.
B. PARENTING COORDINATION
Parenting coordination (PC) is an example of an ADR intervention within the family context that contains directive and even potentially coercive features, depending on the particular manner in which it is practiced. Although spreading, PC is not a very widely used court ADR intervention. PC as practiced in Florida was presented at the conference by Linda Fieldstone and may serve as a model for other jurisdictions to consider. Although featured in the family context, the most important feature of PC-having disputants commit to an ADR intervention for a period of time-might be relevant to other civil disputes, especially those that involve an ongoing relationship. On a broader level, the conclusions from the discussion of PC in the family context can apply to other ADR interventions that tend to be more directive or even coercive.
According to the Guidelines for Parenting Coordination, developed by the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Task Force on Parenting Coordination, the goals of the process are "to assist high conflict parents to implement their parenting plan, to monitor compliance with the details of the plan, to resolve conflicts regarding their children and the parenting plan in a timely manner, and to protect and sustain safe, healthy and meaningful parent-child relationships."
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Under PC, the coordinator provides the parties with a psycho-educational framework, helps the parties develop negotiating skills, and works to resolve parenting-related disputes. 108 Where the parties cannot reach a consensual agreement on their own, the parenting coordinator can make enforceable recommendations.
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PC is particularly useful for high-conflict parenting disputes where the parents are not able to resolve their child-related disputes on their own and constantly revert to relying on the courts to intervene. 110 For these reasons, this intervention can also benefit courts. 111 Some of the characteristics of PC, such as educating the parties with the hope that they themselves will change their destructive dynamic and, in the process, empowering them to make their own decisions, are consistent with the goal of self-determination. 112 Some of the other characteristics of PC, on the other hand, tend to be coercive: there are no guarantees of confidentiality, and the coordinator can, depending on the court order, tell the parties what they must do in the event they cannot agree themselves. 113 Indeed, PC can potentially put the intervener in the position of an arbitrator, 114 which is as coercive and as binding as litigation but without the procedural and substantive fairness guarantees found in the traditional court process. 115 In sum, the PC process itself actually mirrors a dispute resolution continuum, beginning with education on one end of the spectrum and ending with decisions (the scope of which are usually limited by the court order) that are not made by the parties.
The primary justification for including PC and its relatively coercive potential is that parties at times lack the capacity to resolve their issues in a less coercive process and, therefore, need more assistance and direction. Indeed, by the time they are involved with PC, the parties have often demonstrated this lack of capacity, which may justify being ordered by the court to such a process. In fact, the most coercive intervention-litigation-has not worked for these parties as reflected by their ongoing relitigation efforts. While the potential lessening of self-determination within PC may be appropriate for parties who, at least at times, do not seem to have the capacity to make decisions on their own, the reduced fairness guarantees must also be addressed, particularly in light of the fact that a non-judicial professional is put in a position of authority that can impact fundamental rights of parties.
Any jurisdiction that considers implementing PC as part of its family ADR program must provide fairness safeguards. One approach would be to make PC voluntary, allowing parties to decide whether they will sign up for the process after being fully informed of the PC process and the consequences of entering into it. Once they do sign up, the parenting coordinator's recommendation could be binding. Including a process for obtaining meaningful informed consent will provide for meaningful fairness guarantees. Another approach would be to allow for meaningful judicial review of the coordinator's recommendation, similar to the review conducted of magistrates' or bankruptcy judges' recommendations and the judicial review of party-negotiated marital termination agreements. This approach would likely undermine one of the important benefits of PC, which is to avoid relitigation of issues. Presumably, however, the parties would only challenge the coordinator's decision in extreme cases of disagreement; most of the issues will be resolved informally without such challenges. It should be noted, however, that one significant limitation of such judicial review is that the judge is most likely to accept and not overturn the PC intervener's judgment. Nonetheless, the potential review of the PC intervener's decision should provide a check on their power.
However approached, simply mandating parties to PC without careful consideration of the impact on fairness and justice is not appropriate.
C. BEYOND ENE AND PC: IMPLICATIONS TO OTHER ADR INTERVENTIONS
PC and ENE, as well as other interventions, appear to have something in common: they try to meld opportunities for self-determination, such as education and the provision of information, with other process components that tend to be more directive, such as recommendations and reporting, that combined may help to influence the parties' decisions and help them to arrive at an agreement that is best for them. In other words, not only should the various ADR processes be placed along a continuum with different degrees of self-determination and directiveness, such a continuum often exists within the ADR processes themselves. A shift from viewing ADR processes within a narrow self-determination versus directiveness-coercion binary and toward a view of the processes (both in comparison to others and internally) along a continuum should provide even more room for innovation. 116 The level of self-determination allotted to the parties within an ADR process should ideally correlate with the capacity of the parties to self-determine (as long as the parties in fact want to do so); the more capacity the parties have, the more opportunities for self-determination the ADR intervention should allow for. Conversely, the more directive or coercive an intervention is, the larger the concern over fairness and justice must be, as a direct result of the diminished opportunities to self-determine either within the process itself or when entering into the process to begin with. Where concerns of fairness are heightened, alternative fairness safeguards must be incorporated within the intervention.
Broadly speaking, there are three ways to incorporate such safeguards: by establishing fairness through the design and characteristics of the process itself and through the framing of the role of the intervener, as can be seen in the above discussion of ENE; by providing for a truly non-coercive, fully informed, and consensual opt-in to a more coercive intervention, such as the approach suggested above in the context of the PC discussion and incorporated into the design of ENE in Minnesota; 117 or by guaranteeing meaningful court oversight over the non-judicial, potentially coercive decision, the second approach discussed above under PC.
Assuming that a jurisdiction decides to adopt interventions other than mediation, the question then becomes how to channel parties to the appropriate intervention. This question was the subject of one of the presentations at the conference 118 and will be explored in the next Part within the context of tiered and triage ADR systems.
V. MULTI-OPTIONAL ADR SYSTEMS: THE TIERED AND TRIAGE MODELS
If interventions other than mediation-ENE, PC, or any other-are made part of an ADR system, the inquiry then turns to the method of referring parties to the appropriate intervention: who should decide what type of intervention parties will receive 119 and at what point of the process should this decision be made? And in the event the decision is taken out of the hands of the parties themselves, what will be the process for assigning parties to interventions? Mapped onto these questions is the important issue of resource allocation: the effectiveness of an intervention, along with the number of families channeled to a particular intervention, should impact the manner in which funds are allocated to the various forms of intervention within the system. These questions will be looked at by comparing a tiered approach (where the parties usually start with educational programs, then go to mediation, and progress to more directive and potentially intrusive interventions) to the innovative triage approach (where parties are channeled to what is deemed to be the appropriate intervention out of a variety of interventions) that was presented at the conference.
Both tiered and triage-multi-optional ADR programs-provide a menu of interventions in addition to mediation and tend to have a relatively robust level of institutional support. 120 Under one example of a tiered system in the family context, the parties are first provided with a divorce education program and then sent to mandatory mediation. 121 If mediation does not result in a settlement, then the parties are escalated to the next intervention. 122 The interventions progress from the least intrusive and most supportive of self-determination-mediation-to gradually more intensive and directive options 123 that tend to lessen parties' levels of self-determination. As under a tiered system, triaging 124 (or differentiated case management 125 ) consists of ADR interventions with varying levels of self-determination opportunities and varying levels of directiveness, such as providing information, pressuring to settle, predicting court outcomes, and some or all of the above. The significant addition under the triage approach is the inclusion of a screening process that is meant to channel the parties to the more appropriate intervention based on the needs and capacities of the parties. 126 In Connecticut, as one example of a triage approach in the family context, court counselors may recommend that parties attend mediation, a confidential conflict resolution conference, an issue-focused evaluation, or a comprehensive evaluation, a determination made based on the information collected in this initial intake interview. 127 Parties that do not agree with a service recommendation may contest it, but they rarely do.
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A. BALANCING CONSIDERATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY AND PARTY BENEFITS
The tiered and triage approaches in the family context do not differ (at least in theory) over the need to screen for domestic violence or for cases where one or both of the parties lack the necessary capacity due to high levels of substance abuse or mental illness. 129 The real distinction between the two approaches relates to the method of referring parties to particular ADR interventions at the beginning of their involvement with the court. Specifically, the two systems differ in how they approach high-conflict parties that are deemed to have a diminished capacity to work together in a voluntary setting but have no other prohibitive capacity limitations. Under the tiered approach, such parties will be mandated to mediation to maximize their opportunity to self-determine prior to being assigned to other, more "directive and intrusive" ADR interventions. 130 Under a triage approach, some of these cases will be diverted from mandatory mediation through a screening process. 131 Underlying these two different approaches is a debate over how to balance between the effective use of court resources and the relative benefit to the parties. Proponents of the triage approach argue that diverting parties who are less likely to benefit from mediation will free up resources for higher quality mediation 132 and other interventions that are deemed to be more effective for particular parties and circumstances. 133 They also argue that mandating parties to mediation in inappropriate cases may harm the parties due to the impact on the parties' resources and due to the possibility that a failed intervention may actually escalate the dispute between the parties. 134 Proponents of mandatory mediation within a tiered system counter that there is no effective way to properly predetermine whether mediation can be helpful to high-conflict parties. 135 They further argue that many high-conflict parties that initially resist mediation end up tremendously benefiting from maximizing their opportunity to self-determine, which justifies mandating all appropriate highconflict cases to mediation. 136 Indeed, not sending all parties to mediation would result in inappropriately excluding at least some parties from mediation and unduly minimizing their opportunities for self-determination. 137 Therefore, according to proponents of the tiered approach, there is insufficient justification for diverting parties and funds from mediation to other processes, and in fact the opposite may be true.
The difference between the two approaches seems to boil down to whether to risk erring on the side of over-or under-inclusion. Under the triage approach, there is a potential for under-including parties in mediation. Proponents of this approach are willing to take this risk, arguing that a principled and sound method for allocating parties to the appropriate intervention can be designed to diminish the level of under-inclusion. While the risk of under-inclusion is diminished in this manner, the payoff is significant and worthwhile: screening would allow for a better allocation of the resources saved toward other interventions and mediation improvements, which would enhance the system as a whole. 138 Under the tiered approach, on the other hand, there is the potential, almost the certainty, of offering mediation to parties that cannot benefit from it, but proponents of the tiered approach believe that it is difficult to predetermine who can or cannot benefit from mediation. 139 They place a higher value on maximizing opportunities of self-determination at the risk of over-inclusion. 140 They also doubt that it is possible to appropriately prescribe the right intervention under the triage approach, arguing that the risk of under-inclusion is higher than suggested by triage proponents.
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B. CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS IN THE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS
Striking the right balance between the benefits derived by the parties and the efficient use of scarce funds is one piece of the puzzle, while fairness to the parties is the other. Within an ADR system there are three layers where coercion can take place. The first is in the design of the intervention itself, which will dictate whether the intervention will tend to be directive or even potentially coercive (as discussed above in the context of mediation, ENE, and PC). 142 The second is the manner in which the intervention is actually practiced and the related procedural justice implications, regardless of the original intent behind the design of the process (as discussed above in the context of mediation). 143 The third, addressed below, is the manner in which parties are assigned to a process. As to the last, how can this important decision be made in a manner that takes into account fairness considerations? More specifically, who should determine where the parties end up: a judge, court administrator, service provider, or perhaps the parties themselves?
In the tiered system, parties that do not settle through mandatory mediation appear before a judge who has the discretion to mandate that the parties engage in a different, potentially coercive ADR process. The fact that a judge is the one mandating the parties to a different process falls in line with how the judge's authority to manage cases is currently understood; however, this type of authority raises some broad concerns that parties will be mandated to surrogate judges that are not bound by the same standards and considerations of a judge assigned to their role through a democratic process. 144 In the family triage system, the fairness concerns in the manner of assignment focus on the intake screening process. Presumably, a non-judicial professional will have at the very least the informal power to direct parties to a process that is non-voluntary and potentially coercive. 145 The assignment to such a process by a non-judicial professional is significant in light of the fact that it may directly impact the determination of the parties' legal rights. 146 One approach to resolving this problem is the one adopted by proponents of the family triage program in Connecticut. 147 The assignment method in Connecticut provides for a transparent, objective, and vetted process for screening that can include the parties' own input and that also provides for a meaningful opportunity to challenge the ADR assignment. 148 However, there is one significant limitation to this approach: while there is a right to appeal the screener's recommendation, 149 it is safe to presume that mere dissatisfaction with being assigned to an intervention process due to its relatively coercive nature will not provide sufficient grounds for appeal. In other words, the full consent of the parties does not appear to be a prerequisite for assignment.
The simplest solution to the fairness dilemmas raised under either the tiered or triage approaches discussed so far would be to allow the parties themselves to select the process they want, after they fully understand the different options. 150 Such an approach will likely result in at least some parties not selecting the process that would benefit them most (as would be determined by a third party who can presumably do so effectively) or selecting a less effective process, resulting in a waste of scarce public funds. It also may result in parties trying to "game the system" by opting for a process that they believe will most benefit them, and it would require a tie-breaker for times when parties select different processes. Finally, it diminishes the authority of the court to manage cases and does not take into account the lessened level of autonomy of those who put themselves under the authority of the court by seeking the court's intervention. In short, while making the assignment voluntary may provide robust fairness guarantees, it will also potentially undermine the effectiveness of the ADR program and the authority of the court. Nonetheless, this is an approach that must be considered because of its heightened guarantees of fairness and because it is consistent with the idea that plaintiffs get to choose to go to court and, therefore, should be allowed to opt out of the traditional court setting rather than being forced to do so.
A different approach for assignment found in the ADR program established in the Northern District of California provides an interesting variation to the previous two approaches so far discussed. In the Northern District of California's civil ADR program, the ADR system consists of problem-solving mediation, ENE, non-binding arbitration, and judicially hosted settlement conferences. 151 When designing the ADR system, the court explicitly addressed the important questions of the role of the parties and counsel in deciding whether to use ADR and in selecting an ADR process, and the degree the court should encourage or coerce parties into an ADR process in the event they cannot select a process on their own. 152 In response to these questions, a multi-step assignment process was conceived. The process first requires that the attorneys educate their clients about the ADR options and that the attorneys meet and confer with the other side. 153 The parties may customize any of the processes they select. 154 If this selection process fails, the parties are required to participate in an "ADR conference" with the court's ADR staff. If the parties still cannot agree on a process, the ADR administrator either recommends a process to the judge or recommends that the parties do not engage in ADR. The goals of this assignment process are to engage the conflict stakeholders in the process of determining the appropriate intervention for them. 155 While ultimately the assignment decision may be taken out of the hands of the parties and their lawyers, this is done as a last step, which is more "just" both procedurally and substantively.
The approach assumed in the Northern District of California can be labeled as a triage approach: ultimately, a court employee will make a recommendation to the court, which in turn has the authority to bind the parties to a particular process. However, the process of assignment itself is, in fact, tiered: the manner of assignment to the ADR process progresses from the least coercive approach, allowing the parties to make their own process choice, to a more coercive one, where the court, pursuant to a recommendation made by a court administrator, makes the decision for the parties. While the tiered assignment approach is superior to an assignment process that takes the decision completely out of the hands of the stakeholders, it is also potentially resource intensive and will require adaptation to other contexts such as the family one, where most parties are not represented. Nonetheless, it offers a valuable lesson about how one might approach the design of an assignment process itself: it can be designed to include stages along a continuum, where the parties initially might get the opportunity to self-determine what process to participate in and gradually move onto more coercive methods of assignment.
C. THE IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
One important way to determine whether one intervention or ADR system is preferred over others is through empirical research. Data derived from such research can serve to justify allocating resources to particular interventions or ADR systems-tiered, triage, or any other variant-as a whole.
There are a number of challenges to conducting such research. To obtain the best comparative results, assignment to interventions would have to be random and the impact of interventions would have to be measured over time. Such random assignment has the potential of harming some of the families that end up with the less effective or suitable intervention for them. It should therefore come as no surprise that, from a practical standpoint, it is difficult, but not impossible, to get courts to agree to implement random assignment experiments. 157 An alternative method of obtaining good comparative results would be to demonstrate that the characteristics of individuals in different ADR processes are the same.
An additional challenge is that empirical research requires that funds be diverted toward pilot programs and away from existing programs, which again raises questions of priorities in resource allocation. This concern is somewhat tempered within programs where staff are already made responsible for conducting empirical research. An additional challenge is that jurisdictions, and even courts within the same jurisdiction, may vary widely in a number of dimensions that may impact the applicability of the results to other jurisdictions.
The design of the research itself is a separate and serious issue because research requires an agreement about which measures should matter. To name a few potential areas of measurement: self-determinism, efficient resource use, authority of the court, resulting agreement rates, party satisfaction, procedural justice perceptions, which process leads to more efficient use of court time, and any mix of the above. The data relevant to any of these measurements is difficult to obtain; what is to be measured is even more difficult for multiple stakeholders to agree upon.
While implementing empirical research can be challenging, more empirical research is essential, as well as other research approaches. Such research can have more modest goals of measuring the short-term impact of interventions, as well as the perception of the parties about whether they were well-served by a particular intervention. 158 Additionally, focus groups, interviews, and other kinds of qualitative research should also be considered for gathering information about what works and why. The different approaches to research-empirical and otherwise-can provide jurisdictions that seek to make immediate or long-term reforms with guidance regarding the types of ADR modules that work best. *** So far, this Report has focused on providing a framework for discussing the goals of court ADR systems. This discussion largely mirrors the first day of the conference. The next Part of the Report will focus on some of the considerations that go into the actual design and implementation process of ADR systems, which was primarily focused on during the second day of the conference.
The conference attendants were cognizant of the fact that jurisdictions have various cultures (both legal and otherwise), various institutional needs and constraints, and are at various stages of evolution or, sadly, devolution. The assumption therefore was that there cannot be a uniformly ideal ADR program, nor can there be a uniform process for designing and implementing such a system. Nonetheless, there were common elements that the conference attendees highlighted that will be useful to jurisdictions evaluating their specific programs and considering reform.
The next Part of the Report will outline some practical steps to promote, design, implement, and reform ADR programs. 159 The following section is based almost entirely on what the conference participants spoke about as recorded within notes taken by the conference reporters, transcripts of the first day of the conference, and short, informal reports drafted by the five groups convened during the second day of the conference.
VI. THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ADR SYSTEMS
A number of jurisdictions have successfully implemented ADR programs and should be looked to as models as a whole or for specific strategies that worked. 160 The first required step is to initiate the process for reforming or implementing an ADR program. The second is the process of reform or design itself. The last is ensuring the longevity of the ADR program.
A. SETTING THE STAGE FOR ADR
Before approaching the question of how to either design an appropriate ADR program or reform an existing one 161 (initiatives that share common characteristics but also diverge in others), support for such an agenda must be in place. Without this needed support, there will be no political will or there will not be the resources needed for a successful design and implementation of an ADR program.
Such support should come from the broadest range of sources possible: regular citizens who use the system; grassroots, community leaders, preferably with political clout; organized networks within the bar, such as legal-services lawyers, and other professional associations, such as chambers of commerce, ADR associations, and consumer and family advocacy groups; court administrators; legislators; and perhaps most importantly, knowledgeable, energetic, politically savvy, and passionate judges. It is most crucial to identify an individual or individuals within the court system, who can champion ADR and are willing to function as a repository for data and promotion efforts. 162 Some important tools for gaining such support are lobbying, outreach, education, and training. Particular attention has to be placed on the bench and bar. Without the appropriate "buy-in" from lawyers and judges, the ADR processes will likely lose their distinction from the traditional adversarial system, and in fact simply blend into the adversarial system that ADR was meant to be the alternative to. 163 One approach suggested in the conference was offering "value-changing" training opportunities that are attractive to judges and lawyers; these individuals can impact attitudes within the bench and the bar in a manner that may have broad institutional implications. 164 It is also important to include informal relationship-building efforts, such as going to lunch, developing friendships, and more generally, partaking in real conversations with leaders of the various stakeholding groups. Creating documents that contain clear budget rationales that draw on research and evaluation and summarize data to make the case for ADR can also significantly help. Such materials cannot focus solely on narrow judicial economy considerations, otherwise ADR will be adopted for these reasons and no others; the materials should be used to educate stakeholders about the broader goals and benefits derived from these goals, not only to parties but also to lawyers, judges, and even to society as a whole. There are a number of materials already in place that can be relied on for such purposes. 165 
B. WHO SHOULD CONVENE THE PROCESS?
To initiate the actual process of designing or reforming an ADR program, someone or some institution has to assume responsibility for the deliberative process and for identifying and convening stakeholders. 166 One effective convener might be a sympathetic judge with sufficient clout. Some examples of successful "Judge as Convener" scenarios can be found in the Florida, Maryland, and New York processes. In Maryland, the Honorable Robert M. Bell, Chief Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals, created the Maryland ADR Commission in 1998, charging it with "advancing the appropriate use of mediation and other innovative conflict resolution processes throughout Maryland's courts." 167 ADR Florida, another example of a long-standing and robust program, received widespread support from the judiciary. 168 In New York, Chief Judge Judith Kaye pushed for and achieved the reform of the family court system in general, which included a significant ADR component.
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C. INITIAL GOAL-SETTING
The "designer of the system has the power to define the goals of that system" and set the priorities. 170 As noted above in detail, there is often a "significant tension" between "the goals of efficiency and fairness or justice."
171 Clear objectives for the process that take this tension into account must be identified and defined: what types of conflicts the system seeks to address; what goals the system as a whole intends to accomplish; and what goals each intervention within the system intends to accomplish. 172 The initial goals may be framed by the convener in consultation with ADR system design experts. 173 However, these goals cannot be rigid because they may, and in fact should, shift once the voices of the various stakeholders are included, which is a critical part of the deliberative process itself. 174 Alternatively, the goals can be set quite broadly (i.e., to examine the state of ADR and reform it) and the convening process itself can set out to define the specific goals of the process.
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D. IDENTIFYING THE STAKEHOLDERS
The next crucial step is to figure out an inclusive way for deciding who should be part of the discussion that ultimately will shape the ADR system. 176 Identifying and inviting the appropriate stakeholders requires a separate, thoughtful process. Within the process of identifying the stakeholders, it is important to keep in mind that while there are multiple stakeholders, they do not have equal stakes. 177 The stakes are probably highest for those that do not have the resources that would allow them to access services. These stakeholders also have the least leverage to influence the design of the ADR program. Therefore, identifying and including party-surrogates-such as Domestic Violence (DV) advocates, attorneys for the child, and legal aid attorneys-is essential.
E. THE DESIGN PROCESS
The process of how the final decisions will be made with regard to the shape of the proposed ADR program must be clearly defined. A consensus-building process that includes a broad committee with representatives from all of the important stakeholder groups may be lengthy, but it will also ensure broad-based support that is more likely to provide long-term stability. 178 A different approach, which may be more efficient and appropriate in other jurisdictions, would be to require that the individuals assigned with the task of designing the ADR program gather the various perspectives and synthesize them into a coherent recommendation that takes the various gathered perspectives into account. 179 Either approach will also require political buy-in.
The ADR committee members, whether consisting of a large group of stakeholder representatives or a smaller committee, must understand the various perspectives and needs of their counterparts and how they may be impacted by the proposals that are to be evaluated. Particularly where changes to an existing program are involved, there is a need to understand the evolution of the system that is already in place: what is working, what is not working, and why it is or is not working. Similarly, identifying who may be invested in the status quo and how to overcome resistance to change is also a critical step. Probably most critical to the design or reform of a new ADR program is identifying and responding to the existing institutional constraints, such as legislative and budgetary ones.
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F. UNDERREPRESENTED STAKEHOLDERS
Conference attendants emphasized some of the considerations that apply to those who tend to have the least voice in the process design, such as pro se litigants, poor litigants, and often those who are both; children; and domestic violence victims. Including the considerations of those who are impacted most by the ADR system and yet lack the opportunity to participate in the system design process is essential. Indeed, the process design itself is a significant juncture and where self-determination takes place. 181 While this Report does not attempt to summarize all of the possible considerations that may impact the design of an ADR system, it will include a brief discussion of the underrepresented stakeholders that were emphasized by conference attendees.
Children
Although children are often not designated as parties in many family ADR processes, the process may have the most significant impact on them, even more significant than on the adult parties to the conflict themselves, usually parents or legal guardians. Moreover, the state has a particular responsibility toward children; while parental rights are strongly valued and constitutionally protected, such rights are tempered by the state's responsibility to guarantee the well-being of children.
From a child's perspective it is often (but certainly not always) best to settle early, before the court gets fully involved and the conflict becomes increasingly adversarial. 182 In addition, durable solutions are also important to the well-being of the child. For these reasons, litigation is often the least helpful process for children; it tends to last longer and can increase the level of conflict and relitigation. Therefore, front-loading ADR services-services that may lead to quick and durable agreements and stable environments-would benefit children most. At the same time, it is essential that family ADR systems recognize that litigation is sometimes the only way to achieve finality and durability for the children and systems must be designed to respond to these circumstances as well.
183 Moreover, settling early should not be done simply to expedite decisions and without fully investigating abuse, neglect, or both; DV; or other issues that may place a child in harm's way. 184 Finding a way to include the voice of the children within the ADR process is also important. There are risks involved in directly including children in court or ADR processes, but this does not mean that these risks should negate the importance of including children's voices, particularly because there are ways to minimize the risks. 185 Once again, the concept of a continuum can be helpful: the question of child inclusion does not have to be binary, either good or bad, but rather can be examined in terms of degrees, allowing for a convergence between the need to protect and to include children. Including a legal representative of the child within the ADR intervention is one example of an intermediate approach, which requires that courts appropriately fund attorneys for children and fund their participation in the ADR intervention. ADR interventions can also be designed to either center on the child's needs or to include the actual voice of the child, either directly or through a professional trained to do so, which is the practice within some existing and innovative approaches to child-focused mediation. 
Low Income and Pro Se Litigants
Conference participants identified the following considerations that might apply to low income litigants, pro se litigants, or those who are both. 187 First, the ADR system must include incentives for pro bono dispute resolution services. Similarly, a rethinking of fee structures must be considered in order to allow dispute resolution services to be provided to all parties across the board. 188 This may involve charging families what they can afford in a sliding-scale model. Second, the system must be designed to provide information, particularly to pro se litigants. 189 The areas of information that need to be covered for informed choice-making should include the process itself, the substantive legal issues, and the impact of a given decision on the respective parties' rights. Indeed, the degree of self-determination is limited where the parties do not understand both the ADR process and how it operates within the broader court system, regardless of how well an intervention is designed. 190 Third, a variety of ADR interventions, not just mediation, should be expanded to underserved jurisdictions, and the interventions must be targeted to match the parties' needs in order to ensure that these parties' resources-time, money, and emotional resources-are conserved. Along these lines, a more comprehensive suggestion made during the conference was to convene and facilitate a public policy discussion on justice that would name the inequities, and identify related positive and negative characteristics in ADR and in the courts. Fourth, parties should be getting some form of emotional support to help them through very difficult processes. Integrating therapeutic and interdisciplinary approaches within the family law system can have a major impact on this front. Overall, active steps should be taken to ensure that parties are not overwhelmed by the power of the system. Special care must be taken to ensure that parties who lack resources are not overwhelmed by the professionals who have a preexisting relationship with each other. 
Domestic Violence
The example of the DV advocates' response to mediation can illustrate the importance of including DV advocates as stakeholders in the design process of any family ADR intervention or system. Initially, DV advocates opposed mediation where DV was present because they were concerned that individuals suffering from DV would be coerced into agreements that were not good for them. 192 They were also concerned over the possibility that victims will be re-victimized by being in the same room as the offender and by being forced to engage with the offender directly; for the physical safety of the victim during, before, and after mediation; and that the mediation itself could lead to more violence.
193
Much has been written and can be said about DV in the context of family cases, and family ADR in particular. The following is a very modest attempt at summarizing the elements of a broad framework for safe management of DV cases in family ADR (many of which might apply to areas outside the ADR context). 194 Family ADR programs should provide thorough training to those who work within them: judges, lawyers, court administrators, and ADR interveners. Such programs should implement a meaningful 195 screening process that: (1) identifies incidents of violent acts and other types of coercion; (2) analyzes the characteristics of such instances, differentiating between the various types of DV and determining the implications of these differences; (3) assesses the parties' realistic options in light of this analysis; and (4) channels DV cases to the appropriate intervention by allowing the parties to make their own informed choices regarding the type of court intervention they will receive, ADR or otherwise. 196 Moreover, ADR programs must provide DV victims with interventions that first and foremost create a safe environment where the danger of coercion by the offender is negated but also that do not exasperate the risks inherent in DV cases, such as increased future violence. Finally, such programs must provide referrals to other resources that might be needed. This brief outline of a framework is only meant to reiterate how proper treatment of the issue requires a deep understanding of the problem and dedication of the right resources.
G. ENSURING LONGEVITY
One way to promote the longevity of ADR programs is to convene a design or reform process like the one described above. Such a process is likely to result in broad-based support for ADR programs with clearly defined goals, to strike a balance between the various perspectives and often competing goals, and to lead to a stable funding source and authorizing legislation. However, legislators, court administrators, and financial realities change, so continuing efforts of lobbying and education will always be necessary. Validating the programs through research-in terms of the level of the parties' satisfaction, fairness, and efficient use of resources, to name a few key areas-is essential. Conversely, not being afraid to change, improve, or even abandon programs that do not work effectively is also important.
VII. LOOKING FORWARD
Parties in dispute that enter the court system do so out of necessity, due to their inability to resolve their issues on their own. As a consequence they give up a certain level of their autonomy. In the family arena, parents may lose some control over their private family arrangements as a result of the court's authority and responsibility to ensure the best interest and welfare of children. In the civil arena, parties may be forced to leave their home, give up on a family business, or lose their financial autonomy. While parties give up a certain level of their autonomy, often the best resolutions of disputes are those shaped by the parties themselves. 197 The courts must play a significant role in providing parties with adequate services that lead to appropriate resolutions, whether through ADR or otherwise. 198 Courts have a responsibility to ensure that the parties they serve get the right kind of intervention and of the highest quality. 199 Courts also are responsible for guaranteeing that the ADR interventions they sanction provide for guarantees of fairness and justice. Overall, this requires that courts ensure that ADR programs are properly designed, funded, assessed, regulated, and supervised.
The primary barriers to the broad implementation of such programs can be summarized as follows: first and foremost, a lack of financial support and, second, a lack of clarity in defining the goals of court ADR-goals that need to strike an appropriate balance between fairness, justice, effectiveness, benefits to the parties, and efficiency. More generally, an investment in the status quo-by judges, attorneys, and even at times by ADR administrators and neutrals-is hindering the needed changes from taking place.
The conference and this Report are just the beginning of a much broader effort to expand and reform court ADR. The following are some practical steps-all of which were either mentioned explicitly by conference participants or directly derived from their comments-that can be taken in support of such important efforts.
On a National Level
Uniform efforts, such as lobbying for federal legislation that would encourage the development of ADR programs, can have an impact across jurisdictions.
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Conducting more research, empirical or otherwise, will help ADR providers improve their services as well as put them in better positions to promote ADR and educate the relevant stakeholders about it.
Efforts must work within law schools to promote education reform to include ADR training. Related to such efforts, it is also important to write academic articles that promote ADR reform and implementation.
Continued efforts must be directed at gathering information about what is happening throughout the country-for example, the types of programs in place, how they were put in place, and how funding and support are being secured-and directed at effectively sharing such resources with those interested. 201 Similarly, designing particular pilot programs, such as an intake or triage system, and creating a way to share the results with others can be a useful resource.
Efforts, such as those RSI is currently engaged in, to identify local and national ADR organizations and initiatives and to maintain a network of information-sharing and support for jurisdictions engaged in reform efforts can further bolster and help expand the reach of ADR.
Maintaining a database of easy-to-use blueprints for convening an ADR design and ADR implementation process based on the successful experience of other jurisdictions would also help promote the expansion and reform of ADR. 202 With a view to the future, some participants called for working toward redefining the judicial mission as being responsible not just for case management but also for "conflict management." 203 This broader mission would include out-of-court, pre-court interventions to resolve conflict as well as in-court prevention programs such as specialized courts, drug courts, mental health courts, unified family courts, and ADR programs.
On the Local, Jurisdictional Level
Cultivating alliances with the various stakeholders with an eye toward starting an ADR reform process is essential.
Law Schools within the jurisdiction may be able to provide some of the resources and expertise needed to help with reform efforts. Convening conferences with a complete or partial emphasis on local ADR issues, like the one convened at Marquette that is the subject of this Report, may be another useful way to initiate a reform process. 204 Jurisdictions are in various stages of ADR development and have various needs. Each jurisdiction might consider creating a committee charged with first studying and then working toward expanding and reforming the existing ADR programs within their jurisdiction. Identifying the right individuals for such a committee with diverse professional backgrounds and with clout is important. Securing funding for such a process is also crucial. ***
VIII. CONCLUSION
Those who work in the ADR field believe that ADR services are essential to the well-being of individuals, families, businesses, communities, and, by extension, our society as a whole. We must stay focused on providing the best services possible within the court-context and insist on striking the right balance between the institutional goals and the potentially distinctive contribution that ADR has to offer to those in conflict. This will require a clear vision of why ADR is important, an articulated vision that will define how ADR should be practiced, and sustained work toward supporting these visions. In order to remain true to the mission of helping parties navigate their most difficult challenges, we must ensure that the answers to why and how ADR is practiced remain in the forefront. [T] he originally dominant vision of self-determination assumed that the disputing parties would be the principal actors and creators within the mediation process. The parties would: 1) actively and directly participate in the communication and negotiation that occurs during mediation, 2) choose and control the substantive norms to guide their decision-making, 3) create the options for settlement, and 4) control the final decision regarding whether or not to settle.").
NOTES
43. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 810-12 (statement of Professor Stulberg) (arguing that mediation is unique because it promotes self-determination and personal responsibility and should focus on allowing parties to make an informed decision that is not just based on legal rights and to order their lives as a political community); Salem, supra note 19, at 375 (stating that "[t]he argument for the importance of self-determination that mediation offers is as follows: If parents are able to participate in mediation, they will be better able to fully explore options, truly hear one another, and ultimately be empowered to make their own decisions that determine their own future"); see also esearch suggests that institutional and financial pressures have forced court-connected mediation (and mediators) to become predominantly evaluative, directive-and even coercive" with a focus on "brokering a deal").
62. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 823 (statement of Professor Susskind) (stating that " 'mandatory mediation' is a contradiction in terms"). A number of mediation programs, such as custody mediation in California, are mandatory, creating an obvious tension with the presumably voluntary nature of mediation. Proponents of mandatory mediation argue that while entering the process is mandatory, how the parties choose to participate once attending mediation is completely voluntary. See id. at 824 (statement of Professor Stulberg) (stating that coerced into mediation is not the same as coercion in mediation). For a discussion and critique of mandatory mediation, see Landsman, supra note 60, at 286; see also REV. 190, 191 (2010) ; Salem, supra note 19, at 377 (stating that "[i]f mediators lack sufficient time to conduct mediation, it is simply not possible to honor, protect and nurture parties' self-determination").
